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Do budgetary institutions mitigate the common pool problem? New empirical evidence for the EU

We analyze how budgetary institutions affect government budget deficits in member states of the European Union during 1984–2003 employing new indicators provided by Hallerberg et al. (2009). Using panel fixed effects models, we examine whether the impact of budgetary institutions on budget deficits... Full description

Main Author: Haan, Jakob
Contributors: Jong-A-Pin, Richard
Mierau, O.
Contained in: Public Choice Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V Vol. 156, No. 3/4 (2013), p. 423-441
Journal Title: Public Choice
Fulltext access: Fulltext access (direct link - free access) 10.1007/s11127-012-9949-5
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Links: Volltext (dx.doi.org)
ISSN: 1573-7101
Keywords: Budgetary institutions
Fiscal policy
OriginalPaper
Political fragmentation
Size fragmentation
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9949-5
Language: English
Notes: Open Access
Physical Description: Online-Ressource
ID (e.g. DOI, URN): 10.1007/s11127-012-9949-5
s11127-012-9949-5
PPN (Catalogue-ID): SPR034372539
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